Class information for: |
Basic class information |
Class id | #P | Avg. number of references |
Database coverage of references |
---|---|---|---|
16945 | 626 | 31.7 | 37% |
Hierarchy of classes |
The table includes all classes above and classes immediately below the current class. |
Cluster id | Level | Cluster label | #P |
---|---|---|---|
1 | 4 | ECONOMICS//EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH//PSYCHOL | 3876184 |
17 | 3 | BUSINESS//BUSINESS, FINANCE//MANAGEMENT | 121089 |
163 | 2 | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION//ECONOMICS//MARKETING SCIENCE | 22662 |
16945 | 1 | CARTELS//COLLUSION//LENIENCY PROGRAMS | 626 |
Terms with highest relevance score |
rank | Term | termType | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | CARTELS | authKW | 919281 | 8% | 37% | 51 |
2 | COLLUSION | authKW | 494503 | 11% | 15% | 68 |
3 | LENIENCY PROGRAMS | authKW | 491836 | 2% | 92% | 11 |
4 | ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT | authKW | 412159 | 2% | 65% | 13 |
5 | JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS | journal | 360276 | 8% | 14% | 52 |
6 | CARTEL STABILITY | authKW | 343461 | 2% | 54% | 13 |
7 | ANTITRUST | authKW | 229755 | 6% | 13% | 35 |
8 | ANTITRUST POLICY | authKW | 220235 | 3% | 27% | 17 |
9 | OPTIMAL PUNISHMENTS | authKW | 219495 | 1% | 75% | 6 |
10 | CARTEL DETECTION | authKW | 203237 | 1% | 83% | 5 |
Web of Science journal categories |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Economics | 39218 | 84% | 0% | 527 |
2 | Law | 9129 | 23% | 0% | 142 |
3 | History of Social Sciences | 2615 | 5% | 0% | 31 |
4 | Business, Finance | 778 | 5% | 0% | 34 |
5 | Management | 766 | 8% | 0% | 50 |
6 | Agricultural Economics & Policy | 511 | 2% | 0% | 13 |
7 | Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods | 467 | 4% | 0% | 22 |
8 | Business | 374 | 5% | 0% | 30 |
9 | History | 62 | 2% | 0% | 13 |
10 | International Relations | 55 | 1% | 0% | 9 |
Address terms |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | COMPETIT REGULAT GRP | 110852 | 1% | 45% | 5 |
2 | COMPETIT REGULAT ECON DEV | 97555 | 0% | 100% | 2 |
3 | ZEW EUROPEAN ECON | 97555 | 0% | 100% | 2 |
4 | ECON LICADA IREA | 65035 | 0% | 67% | 2 |
5 | ANSSLISIS ECON | 48777 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
6 | CEBA 2107 | 48777 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
7 | CENTERTILECCEPR | 48777 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
8 | CEPR CEF UP | 48777 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
9 | CHAIR IND ORG REGULAT ANTITRUST VWL 1 | 48777 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
10 | COMPETIT COMMISS SOUTH AFRICA | 48777 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
Journals |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS | 360276 | 8% | 14% | 52 |
2 | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 76742 | 8% | 3% | 50 |
3 | REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 62309 | 5% | 4% | 34 |
4 | JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 44839 | 5% | 3% | 31 |
5 | COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL | 34948 | 1% | 8% | 9 |
6 | ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL | 15690 | 2% | 3% | 12 |
7 | RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 13182 | 3% | 1% | 19 |
8 | JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS | 13058 | 3% | 2% | 16 |
9 | EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS | 13023 | 2% | 3% | 10 |
10 | ECONOMIST-NETHERLANDS | 8590 | 1% | 2% | 9 |
Author Key Words |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
LCSH search | Wikipedia search |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | CARTELS | 919281 | 8% | 37% | 51 | Search CARTELS | Search CARTELS |
2 | COLLUSION | 494503 | 11% | 15% | 68 | Search COLLUSION | Search COLLUSION |
3 | LENIENCY PROGRAMS | 491836 | 2% | 92% | 11 | Search LENIENCY+PROGRAMS | Search LENIENCY+PROGRAMS |
4 | ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT | 412159 | 2% | 65% | 13 | Search ANTITRUST+ENFORCEMENT | Search ANTITRUST+ENFORCEMENT |
5 | CARTEL STABILITY | 343461 | 2% | 54% | 13 | Search CARTEL+STABILITY | Search CARTEL+STABILITY |
6 | ANTITRUST | 229755 | 6% | 13% | 35 | Search ANTITRUST | Search ANTITRUST |
7 | ANTITRUST POLICY | 220235 | 3% | 27% | 17 | Search ANTITRUST+POLICY | Search ANTITRUST+POLICY |
8 | OPTIMAL PUNISHMENTS | 219495 | 1% | 75% | 6 | Search OPTIMAL+PUNISHMENTS | Search OPTIMAL+PUNISHMENTS |
9 | CARTEL DETECTION | 203237 | 1% | 83% | 5 | Search CARTEL+DETECTION | Search CARTEL+DETECTION |
10 | COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT | 203237 | 1% | 83% | 5 | Search COMPETITION+LAW+ENFORCEMENT | Search COMPETITION+LAW+ENFORCEMENT |
Core articles |
The table includes core articles in the class. The following variables is taken into account for the relevance score of an article in a cluster c: (1) Number of references referring to publications in the class. (2) Share of total number of active references referring to publications in the class. (3) Age of the article. New articles get higher score than old articles. (4) Citation rate, normalized to year. |
Rank | Reference | # ref. in cl. |
Shr. of ref. in cl. |
Citations |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | LEVENSTEIN, MC , SUSLOW, VY , (2006) WHAT DETERMINES CARTEL SUCCESS?.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE. VOL. 44. ISSUE 1. P. 43 -95 | 61 | 58% | 136 |
2 | ORDONEZ-DE-HARO, JM , TORRES, JL , (2014) PRICE HYSTERESIS AFTER ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM SPANISH FOOD MARKETS.JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS. VOL. 10. ISSUE 1. P. 217 -256 | 31 | 97% | 0 |
3 | HOUBA, H , MOTCHENKOVA, E , WEN, Q , (2015) THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY ON CARTEL PRICING.B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS. VOL. 15. ISSUE 2. P. 351 -389 | 24 | 92% | 0 |
4 | HARRINGTON, JE , CHANG, MH , (2015) WHEN CAN WE EXPECT A CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM TO RESULT IN FEWER CARTELS?.JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS. VOL. 58. ISSUE 2. P. 417 -449 | 20 | 100% | 1 |
5 | GHOSAL, V , SOKOL, DD , (2016) POLICY INNOVATIONS, POLITICAL PREFERENCES, AND CARTEL PROSECUTIONS.REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION. VOL. 48. ISSUE 4. P. 405 -432 | 20 | 87% | 0 |
6 | CORREIA-DA-SILVA, J , PINHO, J , VASCONCELOS, H , (2016) SUSTAINING COLLUSION IN MARKETS WITH ENTRY DRIVEN BY BALANCED GROWTH.JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. VOL. 118. ISSUE 1. P. 1 -34 | 16 | 89% | 0 |
7 | ZHOU, J , (2016) THE RISE AND FALL OF CARTELS WITH MULTI-MARKET COLLUDERS.REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION. VOL. 48. ISSUE 4. P. 381 -403 | 17 | 81% | 0 |
8 | LEVENSTEIN, MC , SUSLOW, VY , (2011) BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO: DETERMINANTS OF CARTEL DURATION.JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS. VOL. 54. ISSUE 2. P. 455-492 | 22 | 61% | 21 |
9 | DE ROOS, N , (2006) EXAMINING MODELS OF COLLUSION: THE MARKET FOR LYSINE.INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION. VOL. 24. ISSUE 6. P. 1083-1107 | 21 | 75% | 7 |
10 | FEINBERG, RM , PARK, M , (2015) DETERRENCE EFFECTS OF KOREAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ON PRODUCER PRICES AND PROFIT MARGINS.JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS. VOL. 11. ISSUE 4. P. 917 -933 | 14 | 88% | 0 |
Classes with closest relation at Level 1 |