Class information for: |
Basic class information |
Class id | #P | Avg. number of references |
Database coverage of references |
---|---|---|---|
13620 | 824 | 20.3 | 52% |
Hierarchy of classes |
The table includes all classes above and classes immediately below the current class. |
Cluster id | Level | Cluster label | #P |
---|---|---|---|
1 | 4 | ECONOMICS//EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH//PSYCHOL | 3876184 |
221 | 3 | ECONOMICS//GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR//SOCIAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICAL METHODS | 50232 |
511 | 2 | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR//INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY//JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 15168 |
13620 | 1 | REPEATED GAMES//FOLK THEOREM//PRIVATE MONITORING | 824 |
Terms with highest relevance score |
rank | Term | termType | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | REPEATED GAMES | authKW | 3239524 | 25% | 43% | 204 |
2 | FOLK THEOREM | authKW | 2190269 | 10% | 73% | 81 |
3 | PRIVATE MONITORING | authKW | 989182 | 4% | 86% | 31 |
4 | IMPERFECT MONITORING | authKW | 577087 | 4% | 54% | 29 |
5 | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | journal | 315447 | 17% | 6% | 136 |
6 | BELIEF FREE EQUILIBRIUM | authKW | 296448 | 1% | 100% | 8 |
7 | INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES | authKW | 285042 | 1% | 77% | 10 |
8 | BOUNDED RECALL | authKW | 226967 | 1% | 88% | 7 |
9 | IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING | authKW | 226967 | 1% | 88% | 7 |
10 | PUBLIC MONITORING | authKW | 190572 | 1% | 86% | 6 |
Web of Science journal categories |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Economics | 50320 | 83% | 0% | 685 |
2 | Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods | 20441 | 20% | 0% | 161 |
3 | Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications | 4880 | 18% | 0% | 146 |
4 | Statistics & Probability | 2290 | 13% | 0% | 109 |
5 | Operations Research & Management Science | 386 | 5% | 0% | 44 |
6 | Mathematics, Applied | 43 | 4% | 0% | 35 |
7 | Law | 30 | 1% | 0% | 12 |
8 | Sociology | 18 | 1% | 0% | 10 |
9 | Philosophy | 18 | 1% | 0% | 8 |
10 | Political Science | 17 | 1% | 0% | 10 |
Address terms |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | MEDS | 47490 | 1% | 13% | 10 |
2 | ECON DECIS SCI | 46884 | 1% | 14% | 9 |
3 | CNRSUMR 8545 | 37056 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
4 | CNRSUMR 8545PARIS JOURDAN SCI ECON | 37056 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
5 | CS FIS MATEMAT NAT | 37056 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
6 | DIPARTIMENTO ECON COMPUTABLE EXPT ECON CEEL | 37056 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
7 | ECON CH EL HILL | 37056 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
8 | EITAN BERLAS ECON | 37056 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
9 | ENPCEHESS | 37056 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
10 | EONOMETRIE | 37056 | 0% | 100% | 1 |
Journals |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 315447 | 17% | 6% | 136 |
2 | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 133558 | 13% | 3% | 111 |
3 | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 85374 | 6% | 5% | 49 |
4 | ECONOMETRICA | 54511 | 7% | 2% | 60 |
5 | THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 37699 | 2% | 7% | 15 |
6 | REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 14771 | 3% | 2% | 26 |
7 | ECONOMIC THEORY | 12192 | 3% | 1% | 25 |
8 | ECONOMICS LETTERS | 11636 | 7% | 1% | 55 |
9 | THEORY AND DECISION | 10349 | 2% | 1% | 19 |
10 | MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 9486 | 3% | 1% | 22 |
Author Key Words |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
LCSH search | Wikipedia search |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | REPEATED GAMES | 3239524 | 25% | 43% | 204 | Search REPEATED+GAMES | Search REPEATED+GAMES |
2 | FOLK THEOREM | 2190269 | 10% | 73% | 81 | Search FOLK+THEOREM | Search FOLK+THEOREM |
3 | PRIVATE MONITORING | 989182 | 4% | 86% | 31 | Search PRIVATE+MONITORING | Search PRIVATE+MONITORING |
4 | IMPERFECT MONITORING | 577087 | 4% | 54% | 29 | Search IMPERFECT+MONITORING | Search IMPERFECT+MONITORING |
5 | BELIEF FREE EQUILIBRIUM | 296448 | 1% | 100% | 8 | Search BELIEF+FREE+EQUILIBRIUM | Search BELIEF+FREE+EQUILIBRIUM |
6 | INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES | 285042 | 1% | 77% | 10 | Search INFINITELY+REPEATED+GAMES | Search INFINITELY+REPEATED+GAMES |
7 | BOUNDED RECALL | 226967 | 1% | 88% | 7 | Search BOUNDED+RECALL | Search BOUNDED+RECALL |
8 | IMPERFECT PUBLIC MONITORING | 226967 | 1% | 88% | 7 | Search IMPERFECT+PUBLIC+MONITORING | Search IMPERFECT+PUBLIC+MONITORING |
9 | PUBLIC MONITORING | 190572 | 1% | 86% | 6 | Search PUBLIC+MONITORING | Search PUBLIC+MONITORING |
10 | COMMUNICATION EQUILIBRIUM | 165063 | 1% | 64% | 7 | Search COMMUNICATION+EQUILIBRIUM | Search COMMUNICATION+EQUILIBRIUM |
Core articles |
The table includes core articles in the class. The following variables is taken into account for the relevance score of an article in a cluster c: (1) Number of references referring to publications in the class. (2) Share of total number of active references referring to publications in the class. (3) Age of the article. New articles get higher score than old articles. (4) Citation rate, normalized to year. |
Rank | Reference | # ref. in cl. |
Shr. of ref. in cl. |
Citations |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | YAMAMOTO, Y , (2014) INDIVIDUAL LEARNING AND COOPERATION IN NOISY REPEATED GAMES.REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES. VOL. 81. ISSUE 1. P. 473-500 | 37 | 82% | 1 |
2 | BURKOV, A , CHAIB-DRAA, B , (2014) REPEATED GAMES FOR MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS: A SURVEY.KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING REVIEW. VOL. 29. ISSUE 1. P. 1-30 | 37 | 80% | 1 |
3 | RENAULT, J , TOMALA, T , (2011) GENERAL PROPERTIES OF LONG-RUN SUPERGAMES.DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS. VOL. 1. ISSUE 2. P. 319 -350 | 29 | 97% | 2 |
4 | FUDENBERG, D , ISHII, Y , KOMINERS, SD , (2014) DELAYED-RESPONSE STRATEGIES IN REPEATED GAMES WITH OBSERVATION LAGS.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY. VOL. 150. ISSUE . P. 487-514 | 26 | 87% | 3 |
5 | DEB, J , GONZALEZ-DIAZ, J , RENAULT, J , (2016) UNIFORM FOLK THEOREMS IN REPEATED ANONYMOUS RANDOM MATCHING GAMES.GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. VOL. 100. ISSUE . P. 1 -23 | 23 | 92% | 0 |
6 | HORNER, J , TAKAHASHI, S , (2016) HOW FAST DO EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFF SETS CONVERGE IN REPEATED GAMES?.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY. VOL. 165. ISSUE . P. 332 -359 | 23 | 85% | 0 |
7 | MIYAGAWA, E , MIYAHARA, Y , SEKIGUCHI, T , (2008) THE FOLK THEOREM FOR REPEATED GAMES WITH OBSERVATION COSTS.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY. VOL. 139. ISSUE 1. P. 192-221 | 24 | 96% | 7 |
8 | TOMALA, T , (2013) BELIEF-FREE COMMUNICATION EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES.MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. VOL. 38. ISSUE 4. P. 617 -637 | 24 | 86% | 1 |
9 | DALKIRAN, NA , (2016) ORDER OF LIMITS IN REPUTATIONS.THEORY AND DECISION. VOL. 81. ISSUE 3. P. 393 -411 | 20 | 95% | 0 |
10 | BARLO, M , CARMONA, G , SABOURIAN, H , (2016) BOUNDED MEMORY FOLK THEOREM.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY. VOL. 163. ISSUE . P. 728 -774 | 20 | 95% | 0 |
Classes with closest relation at Level 1 |