Class information for: |
Basic class information |
Class id | #P | Avg. number of references |
Database coverage of references |
---|---|---|---|
2475 | 3963 | 24.2 | 32% |
Hierarchy of classes |
The table includes all classes above and classes immediately below the current class. |
Terms with highest relevance score |
rank | Term | termType | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | journal | 940822 | 11% | 28% | 444 |
2 | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | journal | 296697 | 6% | 16% | 246 |
3 | SOCIAL CHOICE | authKW | 217339 | 2% | 33% | 86 |
4 | COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE | authKW | 217014 | 1% | 78% | 36 |
5 | SOCIAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICAL METHODS | WoSSC | 203346 | 28% | 2% | 1111 |
6 | APPROVAL VOTING | authKW | 191716 | 1% | 67% | 37 |
7 | JUDGMENT AGGREGATION | authKW | 154203 | 1% | 65% | 31 |
8 | SEMIORDER | authKW | 150642 | 1% | 67% | 29 |
9 | CONDORCET JURY THEOREM | authKW | 135823 | 1% | 77% | 23 |
10 | LINEAR ORDERING PROBLEM | authKW | 134443 | 1% | 73% | 24 |
Web of Science journal categories |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods | 203346 | 28% | 2% | 1111 |
2 | Economics | 68567 | 45% | 1% | 1774 |
3 | Political Science | 22223 | 15% | 1% | 578 |
4 | Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications | 14116 | 14% | 0% | 549 |
5 | Psychology, Mathematical | 12191 | 4% | 1% | 162 |
6 | Statistics & Probability | 4777 | 9% | 0% | 353 |
7 | Philosophy | 2563 | 4% | 0% | 167 |
8 | Ethics | 2362 | 3% | 0% | 106 |
9 | Operations Research & Management Science | 1080 | 4% | 0% | 166 |
10 | Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary | 805 | 3% | 0% | 103 |
Address terms |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | DIPARTIMENTO MATEMAT PLICATA BRUNO DE FINETTI | 46219 | 0% | 100% | 6 |
2 | CREME | 35168 | 0% | 35% | 13 |
3 | DIPARTIMENTO MATEMAT PLICATA BRUNO FINETTI | 30813 | 0% | 100% | 4 |
4 | MURAT SERTEL ADV ECON STUDIES | 23467 | 0% | 38% | 8 |
5 | CEMOI | 21425 | 0% | 35% | 8 |
6 | GEMMA | 19005 | 0% | 22% | 11 |
7 | MRSH | 18864 | 0% | 35% | 7 |
8 | ANAL ECON | 17466 | 1% | 7% | 34 |
9 | COMPLEX SYST PL SYST BIOL | 15406 | 0% | 100% | 2 |
10 | EQUIPE THEORIE DECIS | 15406 | 0% | 100% | 2 |
Journals |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 940822 | 11% | 28% | 444 |
2 | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 296697 | 6% | 16% | 246 |
3 | THEORY AND DECISION | 120344 | 4% | 11% | 142 |
4 | PUBLIC CHOICE | 79547 | 5% | 6% | 181 |
5 | JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY | 71931 | 2% | 9% | 99 |
6 | JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 30256 | 2% | 5% | 84 |
7 | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 25155 | 3% | 3% | 106 |
8 | JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS | 21869 | 1% | 7% | 39 |
9 | AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW | 15578 | 2% | 3% | 60 |
10 | ECONOMIC THEORY | 13584 | 1% | 3% | 58 |
Author Key Words |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
LCSH search | Wikipedia search |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | SOCIAL CHOICE | 217339 | 2% | 33% | 86 | Search SOCIAL+CHOICE | Search SOCIAL+CHOICE |
2 | COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE | 217014 | 1% | 78% | 36 | Search COMPUTATIONAL+SOCIAL+CHOICE | Search COMPUTATIONAL+SOCIAL+CHOICE |
3 | APPROVAL VOTING | 191716 | 1% | 67% | 37 | Search APPROVAL+VOTING | Search APPROVAL+VOTING |
4 | JUDGMENT AGGREGATION | 154203 | 1% | 65% | 31 | Search JUDGMENT+AGGREGATION | Search JUDGMENT+AGGREGATION |
5 | SEMIORDER | 150642 | 1% | 67% | 29 | Search SEMIORDER | Search SEMIORDER |
6 | CONDORCET JURY THEOREM | 135823 | 1% | 77% | 23 | Search CONDORCET+JURY+THEOREM | Search CONDORCET+JURY+THEOREM |
7 | LINEAR ORDERING PROBLEM | 134443 | 1% | 73% | 24 | Search LINEAR+ORDERING+PROBLEM | Search LINEAR+ORDERING+PROBLEM |
8 | VOTING PARADOX | 116413 | 1% | 66% | 23 | Search VOTING+PARADOX | Search VOTING+PARADOX |
9 | RANKING DATA | 113441 | 0% | 82% | 18 | Search RANKING+DATA | Search RANKING+DATA |
10 | BRADLEY TERRY MODEL | 112653 | 1% | 46% | 32 | Search BRADLEY+TERRY+MODEL | Search BRADLEY+TERRY+MODEL |
Core articles |
The table includes core articles in the class. The following variables is taken into account for the relevance score of an article in a cluster c: (1) Number of references referring to publications in the class. (2) Share of total number of active references referring to publications in the class. (3) Age of the article. New articles get higher score than old articles. (4) Citation rate, normalized to year. |
Rank | Reference | # ref. in cl. |
Shr. of ref. in cl. |
Citations |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | CHARON, I , HUDRY, O , (2010) AN UPDATED SURVEY ON THE LINEAR ORDERING PROBLEM FOR WEIGHTED OR UNWEIGHTED TOURNAMENTS.ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. VOL. 175. ISSUE 1. P. 107 -158 | 61 | 71% | 6 |
2 | MONGIN, P , (2012) THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX, THE DISCURSIVE DILEMMA, AND LOGICAL AGGREGATION THEORY.THEORY AND DECISION. VOL. 73. ISSUE 3. P. 315-355 | 41 | 89% | 5 |
3 | ROTHE, J , SCHEND, L , (2013) CHALLENGES TO COMPLEXITY SHIELDS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROTECT ELECTIONS AGAINST MANIPULATION AND CONTROL: A SURVEY.ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. VOL. 68. ISSUE 1-3. P. 161-193 | 37 | 86% | 7 |
4 | CHARON, I , HUDRY, O , (2007) A SURVEY ON THE LINEAR ORDERING PROBLEM FOR WEIGHTED OR UNWEIGHTED TOURNAMENTS.4OR-A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. VOL. 5. ISSUE 1. P. 5 -60 | 51 | 71% | 14 |
5 | SAARI, DG , (2008) COMPLEXITY AND THE GEOMETRY OF VOTING.MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING. VOL. 48. ISSUE 9-10. P. 1335 -1356 | 35 | 100% | 3 |
6 | DISS, M , DOGHMI, A , (2016) MULTI-WINNER SCORING ELECTION METHODS: CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PARADOXES.PUBLIC CHOICE. VOL. 169. ISSUE 1-2. P. 97 -116 | 29 | 97% | 0 |
7 | DIETRICH, F , LIST, C , (2013) PROPOSITIONWISE JUDGMENT AGGREGATION: THE GENERAL CASE.SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. VOL. 40. ISSUE 4. P. 1067-1095 | 30 | 97% | 5 |
8 | ERDELYI, G , FELLOWS, MR , ROTHE, J , SCHEND, L , (2015) CONTROL COMPLEXITY IN BUCKLIN AND FALLBACK VOTING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS.JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEM SCIENCES. VOL. 81. ISSUE 4. P. 632 -660 | 26 | 96% | 4 |
9 | DIETRICH, F , SPIEKERMANN, K , (2013) EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY WITH DEFENSIBLE PREMISES.ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY. VOL. 29. ISSUE 1. P. 87 -120 | 27 | 100% | 5 |
10 | GODFREY, J , GROFMAN, B , FELD, SL , (2011) APPLICATIONS OF SHAPLEY-OWEN VALUES AND THE SPATIAL COPELAND WINNER.POLITICAL ANALYSIS. VOL. 19. ISSUE 3. P. 306 -324 | 31 | 94% | 0 |
Classes with closest relation at Level 2 |