Class information for: |
Basic class information |
Class id | #P | Avg. number of references |
Database coverage of references |
---|---|---|---|
7205 | 1393 | 25.6 | 33% |
Hierarchy of classes |
The table includes all classes above and classes immediately below the current class. |
Cluster id | Level | Cluster label | #P |
---|---|---|---|
1 | 4 | ECONOMICS//EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH//PSYCHOL | 3876184 |
221 | 3 | ECONOMICS//GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR//SOCIAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICAL METHODS | 50232 |
2475 | 2 | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE//MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES//SOCIAL CHOICE | 3963 |
7205 | 1 | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE//COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE//APPROVAL VOTING | 1393 |
Terms with highest relevance score |
rank | Term | termType | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | journal | 835353 | 18% | 15% | 248 |
2 | COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE | authKW | 518888 | 2% | 72% | 33 |
3 | APPROVAL VOTING | authKW | 382956 | 2% | 56% | 31 |
4 | VOTING PARADOX | authKW | 303091 | 2% | 63% | 22 |
5 | SOCIAL CHOICE | authKW | 271722 | 4% | 22% | 57 |
6 | CONDORCET EFFICIENCY | authKW | 241108 | 1% | 100% | 11 |
7 | CONDORCET WINNER | authKW | 229073 | 1% | 58% | 18 |
8 | BORDA RULE | authKW | 175343 | 1% | 67% | 12 |
9 | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | journal | 162745 | 8% | 7% | 108 |
10 | VOTING RULES | authKW | 157795 | 1% | 40% | 18 |
Web of Science journal categories |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods | 100206 | 33% | 1% | 462 |
2 | Economics | 34972 | 54% | 0% | 748 |
3 | Political Science | 24930 | 26% | 0% | 359 |
4 | Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications | 3492 | 12% | 0% | 163 |
5 | Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary | 1480 | 6% | 0% | 78 |
6 | Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence | 403 | 5% | 0% | 70 |
7 | Psychology, Mathematical | 359 | 1% | 0% | 17 |
8 | Statistics & Probability | 287 | 4% | 0% | 56 |
9 | Mathematics, Applied | 221 | 6% | 0% | 88 |
10 | Computer Science, Theory & Methods | 180 | 4% | 0% | 53 |
Address terms |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | CREME | 71665 | 1% | 30% | 11 |
2 | CEMOI | 60981 | 1% | 35% | 8 |
3 | MURAT SERTEL ADV ECON STUDIES | 51135 | 1% | 33% | 7 |
4 | EQUIPE THEORIE DECIS | 43838 | 0% | 100% | 2 |
5 | GEMMA | 36219 | 1% | 18% | 9 |
6 | CNRSUMR 6211 | 32875 | 0% | 50% | 3 |
7 | MRSH BUR 230 | 29224 | 0% | 67% | 2 |
8 | CE UR | 28833 | 0% | 26% | 5 |
9 | ECON DISCIPLINES | 26972 | 0% | 31% | 4 |
10 | CREM | 25006 | 1% | 7% | 17 |
Journals |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 835353 | 18% | 15% | 248 |
2 | MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 162745 | 8% | 7% | 108 |
3 | PUBLIC CHOICE | 143603 | 10% | 5% | 144 |
4 | THEORY AND DECISION | 53261 | 4% | 4% | 56 |
5 | BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE | 19459 | 1% | 5% | 17 |
6 | GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION | 17296 | 2% | 3% | 24 |
7 | JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS | 16380 | 1% | 4% | 20 |
8 | AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW | 14273 | 2% | 2% | 34 |
9 | ECONOMIC THEORY | 7780 | 2% | 1% | 26 |
10 | JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH | 7108 | 1% | 2% | 17 |
Author Key Words |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
LCSH search | Wikipedia search |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE | 518888 | 2% | 72% | 33 | Search COMPUTATIONAL+SOCIAL+CHOICE | Search COMPUTATIONAL+SOCIAL+CHOICE |
2 | APPROVAL VOTING | 382956 | 2% | 56% | 31 | Search APPROVAL+VOTING | Search APPROVAL+VOTING |
3 | VOTING PARADOX | 303091 | 2% | 63% | 22 | Search VOTING+PARADOX | Search VOTING+PARADOX |
4 | SOCIAL CHOICE | 271722 | 4% | 22% | 57 | Search SOCIAL+CHOICE | Search SOCIAL+CHOICE |
5 | CONDORCET EFFICIENCY | 241108 | 1% | 100% | 11 | Search CONDORCET+EFFICIENCY | Search CONDORCET+EFFICIENCY |
6 | CONDORCET WINNER | 229073 | 1% | 58% | 18 | Search CONDORCET+WINNER | Search CONDORCET+WINNER |
7 | BORDA RULE | 175343 | 1% | 67% | 12 | Search BORDA+RULE | Search BORDA+RULE |
8 | VOTING RULES | 157795 | 1% | 40% | 18 | Search VOTING+RULES | Search VOTING+RULES |
9 | CONDORCET | 143859 | 1% | 41% | 16 | Search CONDORCET | Search CONDORCET |
10 | PLURALITY RULE | 134238 | 1% | 44% | 14 | Search PLURALITY+RULE | Search PLURALITY+RULE |
Core articles |
The table includes core articles in the class. The following variables is taken into account for the relevance score of an article in a cluster c: (1) Number of references referring to publications in the class. (2) Share of total number of active references referring to publications in the class. (3) Age of the article. New articles get higher score than old articles. (4) Citation rate, normalized to year. |
Rank | Reference | # ref. in cl. |
Shr. of ref. in cl. |
Citations |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | ROTHE, J , SCHEND, L , (2013) CHALLENGES TO COMPLEXITY SHIELDS THAT ARE SUPPOSED TO PROTECT ELECTIONS AGAINST MANIPULATION AND CONTROL: A SURVEY.ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. VOL. 68. ISSUE 1-3. P. 161-193 | 37 | 86% | 7 |
2 | DISS, M , DOGHMI, A , (2016) MULTI-WINNER SCORING ELECTION METHODS: CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PARADOXES.PUBLIC CHOICE. VOL. 169. ISSUE 1-2. P. 97 -116 | 29 | 97% | 0 |
3 | ERDELYI, G , FELLOWS, MR , ROTHE, J , SCHEND, L , (2015) CONTROL COMPLEXITY IN BUCKLIN AND FALLBACK VOTING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS.JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEM SCIENCES. VOL. 81. ISSUE 4. P. 632 -660 | 26 | 96% | 4 |
4 | GODFREY, J , GROFMAN, B , FELD, SL , (2011) APPLICATIONS OF SHAPLEY-OWEN VALUES AND THE SPATIAL COPELAND WINNER.POLITICAL ANALYSIS. VOL. 19. ISSUE 3. P. 306 -324 | 31 | 94% | 0 |
5 | BRANDT, F , BRILL, M , HEMASPAANDRA, E , HEMASPAANDRA, LA , (2015) BYPASSING COMBINATORIAL PROTECTIONS: POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS FOR SINGLE-PEAKED ELECTORATES.JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH. VOL. 53. ISSUE . P. 439 -496 | 26 | 87% | 3 |
6 | SAARI, DG , (2008) COMPLEXITY AND THE GEOMETRY OF VOTING.MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING. VOL. 48. ISSUE 9-10. P. 1335 -1356 | 31 | 89% | 3 |
7 | POPOVA, A , REGENWETTER, M , MATTEI, N , (2013) A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL CHOICE.ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. VOL. 68. ISSUE 1-3. P. 5 -30 | 26 | 93% | 1 |
8 | FALISZEWSKI, P , HEMASPAANDRA, E , HEMASPAANDRA, LA , (2011) MULTIMODE CONTROL ATTACKS ON ELECTIONS.JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH. VOL. 40. ISSUE . P. 305 -351 | 25 | 93% | 15 |
9 | MIASKO, T , FALISZEWSKI, P , (2016) THE COMPLEXITY OF PRICED CONTROL IN ELECTIONS.ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. VOL. 77. ISSUE 3-4. P. 225 -250 | 22 | 96% | 0 |
10 | VAN DEEMEN, A , (2014) ON THE EMPIRICAL RELEVANCE OF CONDORCET'S PARADOX.PUBLIC CHOICE. VOL. 158. ISSUE 3-4. P. 311-330 | 26 | 84% | 0 |
Classes with closest relation at Level 1 |