Class information for: |
Basic class information |
Class id | #P | Avg. number of references |
Database coverage of references |
---|---|---|---|
619 | 3241 | 26.9 | 52% |
Hierarchy of classes |
The table includes all classes above and classes immediately below the current class. |
Cluster id | Level | Cluster label | #P |
---|---|---|---|
1 | 4 | ECONOMICS//EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH//PSYCHOL | 3876184 |
17 | 3 | BUSINESS//BUSINESS, FINANCE//MANAGEMENT | 121089 |
965 | 2 | ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY//AUCTIONS//MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 10698 |
619 | 1 | AUCTIONS//COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS//ONLINE AUCTIONS | 3241 |
Terms with highest relevance score |
rank | Term | termType | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | AUCTIONS | authKW | 2327062 | 17% | 46% | 537 |
2 | COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS | authKW | 754276 | 4% | 65% | 124 |
3 | ONLINE AUCTIONS | authKW | 663549 | 4% | 59% | 119 |
4 | MULTI UNIT AUCTIONS | authKW | 504452 | 2% | 91% | 59 |
5 | FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS | authKW | 502892 | 2% | 86% | 62 |
6 | MECHANISM DESIGN | authKW | 398821 | 6% | 22% | 191 |
7 | PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS | authKW | 313500 | 1% | 79% | 42 |
8 | SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS | authKW | 286551 | 1% | 89% | 34 |
9 | ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS | authKW | 277238 | 1% | 89% | 33 |
10 | SECOND PRICE AUCTION | authKW | 259727 | 1% | 77% | 36 |
Web of Science journal categories |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Economics | 113956 | 63% | 1% | 2053 |
2 | Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods | 14636 | 8% | 1% | 273 |
3 | Operations Research & Management Science | 10781 | 13% | 0% | 434 |
4 | Management | 10253 | 13% | 0% | 407 |
5 | Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications | 3170 | 7% | 0% | 243 |
6 | Business | 2721 | 6% | 0% | 182 |
7 | Business, Finance | 1769 | 4% | 0% | 119 |
8 | Computer Science, Information Systems | 1516 | 6% | 0% | 200 |
9 | Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence | 1332 | 6% | 0% | 190 |
10 | Statistics & Probability | 981 | 5% | 0% | 154 |
Address terms |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | ECON | 64790 | 26% | 1% | 842 |
2 | ECON THEORY 1 | 39237 | 0% | 42% | 10 |
3 | INTERNEG | 21527 | 0% | 57% | 4 |
4 | ESEI MARKET DESIGN | 21193 | 0% | 75% | 3 |
5 | IND SOLUT LOGIST TT BAO | 18839 | 0% | 100% | 2 |
6 | PK BUSINESS SUSTAINABLE ENTERPRISE | 18839 | 0% | 100% | 2 |
7 | STUDI LEVI CASES | 18839 | 0% | 100% | 2 |
8 | AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY ECON | 16953 | 0% | 60% | 3 |
9 | UFR SJEPG | 16742 | 0% | 44% | 4 |
10 | INFORMAT I18 | 12558 | 0% | 67% | 2 |
Journals |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 161268 | 6% | 9% | 193 |
2 | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 93093 | 6% | 5% | 184 |
3 | RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 50935 | 3% | 6% | 85 |
4 | ECONOMIC THEORY | 43813 | 3% | 5% | 94 |
5 | REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN | 38170 | 1% | 17% | 24 |
6 | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 35046 | 2% | 5% | 77 |
7 | ECONOMICS LETTERS | 31980 | 6% | 2% | 181 |
8 | ECONOMETRICA | 29702 | 3% | 4% | 88 |
9 | AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS | 20326 | 1% | 9% | 25 |
10 | MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 18818 | 3% | 2% | 98 |
Author Key Words |
Rank | Term | Chi square | Shr. of publ. in class containing term |
Class's shr. of term's tot. occurrences |
#P with term in class |
LCSH search | Wikipedia search |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | AUCTIONS | 2327062 | 17% | 46% | 537 | Search AUCTIONS | Search AUCTIONS |
2 | COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS | 754276 | 4% | 65% | 124 | Search COMBINATORIAL+AUCTIONS | Search COMBINATORIAL+AUCTIONS |
3 | ONLINE AUCTIONS | 663549 | 4% | 59% | 119 | Search ONLINE+AUCTIONS | Search ONLINE+AUCTIONS |
4 | MULTI UNIT AUCTIONS | 504452 | 2% | 91% | 59 | Search MULTI+UNIT+AUCTIONS | Search MULTI+UNIT+AUCTIONS |
5 | FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS | 502892 | 2% | 86% | 62 | Search FIRST+PRICE+AUCTIONS | Search FIRST+PRICE+AUCTIONS |
6 | MECHANISM DESIGN | 398821 | 6% | 22% | 191 | Search MECHANISM+DESIGN | Search MECHANISM+DESIGN |
7 | PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS | 313500 | 1% | 79% | 42 | Search PROCUREMENT+AUCTIONS | Search PROCUREMENT+AUCTIONS |
8 | SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS | 286551 | 1% | 89% | 34 | Search SEQUENTIAL+AUCTIONS | Search SEQUENTIAL+AUCTIONS |
9 | ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS | 277238 | 1% | 89% | 33 | Search ASYMMETRIC+AUCTIONS | Search ASYMMETRIC+AUCTIONS |
10 | SECOND PRICE AUCTION | 259727 | 1% | 77% | 36 | Search SECOND+PRICE+AUCTION | Search SECOND+PRICE+AUCTION |
Core articles |
The table includes core articles in the class. The following variables is taken into account for the relevance score of an article in a cluster c: (1) Number of references referring to publications in the class. (2) Share of total number of active references referring to publications in the class. (3) Age of the article. New articles get higher score than old articles. (4) Citation rate, normalized to year. |
Rank | Reference | # ref. in cl. |
Shr. of ref. in cl. |
Citations |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | LORENTZIADIS, PL , (2016) OPTIMAL BIDDING IN AUCTIONS FROM A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE.EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH. VOL. 248. ISSUE 2. P. 347 -371 | 204 | 87% | 0 |
2 | KWASNICA, AM , SHERSTYUK, K , (2013) MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS. VOL. 27. ISSUE 3. P. 461-490 | 80 | 84% | 6 |
3 | PHAM, L , TEICH, J , WALLENIUS, H , WALLENIUS, J , (2015) MULTI-ATTRIBUTE ONLINE REVERSE AUCTIONS: RECENT RESEARCH TRENDS.EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH. VOL. 242. ISSUE 1. P. 1 -9 | 55 | 90% | 14 |
4 | HASKER, K , SICKLES, R , (2010) EBAY IN THE ECONOMIC LITERATURE: ANALYSIS OF AN AUCTION MARKETPLACE.REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION. VOL. 37. ISSUE 1. P. 3 -42 | 55 | 87% | 19 |
5 | WANG, H , CHEN, HM , (2016) DETERRING BIDDER COLLUSION: AUCTION DESIGN COMPLEMENTS ANTITRUST POLICY.JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS. VOL. 12. ISSUE 1. P. 31 -68 | 51 | 85% | 0 |
6 | LOERTSCHER, S , MARX, LM , WILKENING, T , (2015) A LONG WAY COMING: DESIGNING CENTRALIZED MARKETS WITH PRIVATELY INFORMED BUYERS AND SELLERS.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE. VOL. 53. ISSUE 4. P. 857 -897 | 66 | 64% | 1 |
7 | MADDEN, G , SAGLAM, I , HUSSAIN, I , (2015) SPECTRUM AUCTION DESIGNS AND REVENUE VARIATIONS.APPLIED ECONOMICS. VOL. 47. ISSUE 17. P. 1748 -1763 | 48 | 87% | 0 |
8 | DE CASTRO, LI , KARNEY, DH , (2012) EQUILIBRIA EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION IN AUCTIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND OPEN QUESTIONS.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS. VOL. 26. ISSUE 5. P. 911 -932 | 54 | 75% | 1 |
9 | SANYAL, P , (2016) CHARACTERISTICS AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF JUMP BIDS IN COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS.INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH. VOL. 27. ISSUE 2. P. 347 -364 | 42 | 86% | 0 |
10 | GUPTA, A , PARENTE, ST , SANYAL, P , (2012) COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR HEALTH INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LESSONS FROM THE ONLINE HMO AUCTIONS.INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE & ECONOMICS. VOL. 12. ISSUE 4. P. 303-322 | 40 | 89% | 3 |
Classes with closest relation at Level 1 |