Prepared for IK 2514 Wireless Infrastructure Deployment & Economics

Telecom regulation and spectrum



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Agenda



- Why regulation
- The role of the regulator
- Regulation of electronic communication
- European Commission:
 Telecoms Single Market
- Conclusions



If regulation is the answer what is then the question?

How to organize road traffic?







How to organize air traffic?





How to organize rail traffic?





How to control the financial market?






How to maintain a natural monopoly?




Interconnection with other networks?





How to allocate spectrum?



Development of telecommunications



High fixed cost – low marginal cost Economy of scale

Price deflation

Monopoly

Liberalization - competition

Telecom 3.0 Regulation 3.0

1880

1920

1980

2010

2020

Key words

- Essential facility
- Ex ante
- Ex post
- SMP (Significant Market Power)
- Three criteria (entry barriers, no movement towards competition, competition law)



EU regulatory framework - National laws and regulation

Table	Perspective	Question	Issues
Α	Denmark: challenger	View on regulation? How does it impact the business and the ability to provide services.	Interconnection, termination, network sharing, backhaul, spectrum
В	Sweden: incumbent	See above	SMP-obligations, unbundling, obligations, spectrum
С	Spain: new entrant	See above	Termination, interconnection, MVNO, backhaul, spectrum
D	Kazakhstan: dominating operator	See above	Interconnection, termination, backhaul, spectrum
Е	Nigera: possible entry	See above	MVNO, interconnection, VoIP, termination, spectrum,

Examine the view and priorities on regulation for each perspective

The role of the regulator



- Sector specific ex ante (decide on obligations for operators with significant market power (SMP))
- Safeguard price worthy services to end customers
- Implement directives/national regulation
- Allocate spectrum

What is the aim with telecommunication regulation?

Competition Authority

 General purpose Ex-post (violation towards the rule of law) gives the competitive authority a mandate to intervene



Other regulatory bodies, issuing building permits

Telecom and competition authorities are commonly separate agencies, but Ofcom in the UK combine the two roles

Ex ante vs ex post regulation

 Ex ante regulation is anticipatory intervention concerned with market structure, number of firms and level of market concentration entry conditions and the degree of product differentiation



 Ex post regulation addresses specific allegations of anti-competitive behavior or market abuse.

It aims to redress proven misconduct through a range of enforcement options including fines, injunctions, or bans.

Essential facility

- Doctrine
- Bottle-neck (railroads, monopolist refusal to deal...)
- Not replicable (like the copper access network)
- Investment ladder
- Access



SMP criteria



- Market power (market shares) >25%
- Control of infrastructure not easily duplicated
- Technological advantages or superiority
- Absence of or low countervailing buying power
- Economies of scale and scope
- Vertical integration
- Highly developed distribution and sales network



Three criteria test

- The presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry
- A market structure which does not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon
- The insufficiency of competition law alone to adequately address the market failures
- The EU Commission identifies markets that should be subject to regulation (can veto market definition but not obligations)
- The National Regulatory Authorities pursue SMPanalysis



Relevant markets defined by the Commission

Retail level

1. Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential and non-residential customers



Wholesale level

- 2. Call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location
- 3. Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location
- Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed location
- 5. Wholesale broadband access
- Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines, irrespective of the technology used to provide leased or dedicated capacity
- 7. Voice call termination on individual mobile networks

Interconnection

- Communication between different networks
- Fixed to mobile termination
- Mobile to mobile termination
- Mobile to fixed termination
- Cost recovery
- Origination

What would a network be without interconnection?



Mobile termination

- Monopoly on terminating calls (voice calls)
- Regulated price to terminate calls
- LRIC (Long run incremental cost)
- EU directive on mobile termination
- No termination on mobile data (but transit or peering are needed)



What is the link between termination prices on wholesale and prices that operators charge end-customers? Explore pricing strategies with on-net and off-net prices?

Initiative from the Commission

- Telecom Single Market => connected continent
- Recommendation: Wholesale network access costing methodologies and non-discrimination
- Net neutrality, but specialized services on dedicated QoS
- Mobile roaming decoupling of subscriptions while roaming, agreements between operators could give an exemption of decoupling, enable subscribers to always pay "local prices".
- A single authorization for operating in all 28 member states
- Spectrum allocation increased mandate to the EU Commission

For more information: www.ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda




Remedy	Example
Obligations to provide access, or other obligations	Origination, termination, unbundling, wholesale access,
Access to facilities	Place equipment, backhaul, support systems
Non-discrimination	Treat wholesale customers the same way as the internal retail operation
Cost oriented prices	Price regulation, LLUB, termination charges

Table	Role	Area	Issues
A	Regulator/EU Commission	Spectrum	Allocation methods, reserve price, single authorization
В	Regulator/EU Commission	Termination charges, pure LRIC, roaming	Termination, interconnect, MVNO,
С	Incumbent/challenger	Fixed infrastructure, LLUB, dark fiber, VULA	SMP, unbundling, obligations, price regulation
D	Regulator/EU Commission	Fixed infrastructure, LLUB, dark fiber, VULA	SMP, unbundling, obligations,
Е	Incumbent/challenger	Termination charges, pure LRIC, roaming	Termination, interconnect, MVNO, spectrum
F	Incumbent/challenger	Spectrum	Allocation methods, reserve price, single authorization

Elaborate your view on regulation, and how the different issues should be handled by the regulator

Conclusions



- Operators have to cope with regulation
- Essential facility
- Ex ante
- Ex post
- SMP (Significant Market Power)
- Three criteria (entry barriers, no movement towards competition, competition law)
- Mobile termination is declining in importance
- Competition is key to develop the market



Regulatory authorities/interest groups

- US FCC
- UK Ofcom
- Sweden PTS
- Regulatory bodies
- ERG (http://www.berec.europa.eu)
- ECTA (<u>http://www.ectaportal.com/en</u>)
- NRAs decisions has to be in line with the Commission's practice and the relevant jurisprudence of the European Courts





SPECTRUM

UNITED

STATES


FREQUENCY

ALLOCATIONS

THE RADIO SPECTRUM



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE



Spectrum management



- Spectrum allocation
 - Administrative allocation
 - Auctions
 - Beauty contest



Spectrum Sweden



- Swedish spectrum policy vs. revised directives
- IMT bands have been allocated: 800, 900, 1800, 2100, 2600 MHz
- Future spectrum releases

The PTS spectrum policy



- When selection procedures are required, an auction should be applied in the first instance
- Second-hand trading (transfer of licences) shall be promoted
- Licence exemption should be introduced where there is little risk of harmful interference and there are no other impediments



The 800 award in Sweden 2011



- Auction format similar to the Swedish 2.6 GHz auction (SMRA with switching)
- Started bid at SEK 150 million per license
- Coverage obligations for one of the licenses:
 - License holder shall cover households and working places that do not today have basic possibilities for broadband (today approx. 1000-1500)
 - License holder promises to invest in coverage up to SEK 300 million

The 800 award in Sweden

The auction closed after 31 rounds and five days



Bidder	Bandwidt h, MHz	Auction proceeds, SEK	Amount for coverage, SEK
HI3G Access AB	2x10	431 000 000	
Net4Mobility HB	2x10	469 000 000	300 000 000
TeliaSonera Mobile Networks AB	2x10	854 000 000	


- For Net4Mobility SEK 300 million comprise bids for coverage for those households and fixed places of business that lack broadband
- Com Hem AB and Netett Sverige AB also participated in the auction but did not win any licenses.

900 MHz

 PTS decided in 2009 that the license holders in 900 should have their licenses renewed with new frequency arrangements and technical conditions



- However, the issue was under legal challenge, resolved by February 2011
- Current licenses have according to the decision been renewed with no changes when it comes to frequency arrangements and technical conditions
- New frequency arrangement and technical conditions entered into force in May 2011




Spectrum Allocation in Sweden today


	800	900	1800	2100	2600	Σ
Hi3G	10	5	0	19.8 5 TDD	10 50 TDD	44.8 55 TDD
TeliaSonera	10	10	35	0	20	75
Net4Mobility(T2+ TN)	10	6	35	0	40	71
Tele2	0	9	0	0	0	9
Telenor	0	5	0	19.8 5 TDD	0	24.8 5 TDD
Sulab (TS+T2)	0	0	0	19.8 5 TDD	0	19.8 5 TDD

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Questions

- How is the production cost affected by different levels of spectrum?
- How does the use of spectrum aggregation influence the evaluation of spectrum?





Base station density for "low" (left) and "higher" (right) depends on amount of spectrum and the carrier frequencies


Estimate the value of spectrum

- **Economic value** of spectrum can be assessed by estimating the value of the economic activities through the contribution to the GDP
- Marginal value of spectrum
 - **Engineering value** is determined by cost savings in infrastructure of the operator's network obtained when additional spectrum is used.
 - Strategic value reflects the expected position and competitive advantage an operator would hold in the market as a result of the assigned spectrum



Approach - technical

- Coverage = π * cell range²
- Capacity = Bandwidths (MHz) * number of sites * sectors * spectrum
- Bit rate = MHz * spectrum efficiency
- Busy hour = 12.5%



Capex comparison - 700 MHz vs higher bands

Traffic share

ф
W VETENSKAP
Se och konst

	0%	15%	50%	100%
700 MHz	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00
900 MHz	1,69	1,52	1,34	1,20
2100 MHz	4,05	3,33	2,45	1,96
2600 MHz	7,13	5,66	(3,96)	2,92

Capex for each band is normalized to cost of deployment in 700 MHz

Source: Azcoitia et al (2010)

License exempt - unlicensed



- PTS Regulation on license exempt (PTSFS:2007.4) on the 2.4 GHz and 5.3 GHz band for 'short-range device' (ISM), radio transmitters which provide either unidirectional or bidirectional communication and which transmit over a short distance at low power (WiFi)
- 2400-2483.5 MHz, maximum 100 mW e.i.r.p
- 5150-5250, 5250-5350 MHz, maximum 200 mW e.i.r.p

Source: 2006/771/EG – Commission decision of 9 November 2006 on harmonization of the radio spectrum for use by short-range devices

(source: http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:312:0066:0070:

EN:PDF

Conclusions



- Spectrum is a vital and scarce resource making allocation decisions to key events
- Market mechanism in allocation but yet no spectrum trading
- The license exempt for WiFi underscores that allocation mechanism should be combined
- Exclusively allocated harmonized spectrum is set to be the main principle to allocation...